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The Confluence of Sullivan v.
Harnisch & Dodd-Frank
ADAPTING NEW YORK’S COMMON LAW TO FILL A
COMPLIANCE HOLE
INTRODUCTION
In May 2012, Joseph Sullivan lost a wrongful termination
suit against Peconic Partners LLC and Peconic Asset Managers
LLC (together, Peconic).1 Sullivan, a partner of both firms, alleged
that he was fired after bringing improper trading activity to the
attention of Peconic’s CEO.2 In its decision, the New York Court of
Appeals adhered to New York’s strict at-will employment
doctrine, which states that “absent violation of a constitutional
requirement, statute or contract, ‘an employer’s right at any
time to terminate an employment at will remains unimpaired.’”3
The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to grant the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.4 The court in
Sullivan declined to create a new exception to New York’s at-will
employment doctrine and rejected an application of the doctrine’s
only exception5 to salvage Sullivan’s claim.6
Although the Court of Appeals may have ruled in Peconic’s
favor, its decision may ultimately undercut the ability of New
York’s private investment advisers to maintain effective
compliance programs. When coupled with existing state and
federal whistleblower protections, the outcome in Sullivan only
adds to the already strong incentives encouraging a similarly
1 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 2012).
2 Id. at 759.
3 Id. at 760 (quoting Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91
(N.Y. 1983)).
4 Id. at 761.
5 The exception pertains to attorneys within law firms, and it protects
attorneys who internally report the improper behavior of colleague attorneys. See
Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
6 Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 760.
1266 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:3
situated employee to externally disclose a potential securities
law violation instead of making the complaint in-house.7
Neither New York’s common law nor its whistleblower
statute8 provide employees of private investment advisers adequate
protection against retaliatory action for disclosing potential
securities law violations.9 These firms include hedge funds and
private equity funds, many of which under Dodd-Frank were
required to register with the SEC pursuant to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.10 As registered investment advisers, these
firms must appoint chief compliance officers and create policies and
procedures that promote adherence to federal securities laws.11
To protect oneself against retaliatory action, an employee
like Sullivan—one who becomes aware of a potential securities
law violation by her employer but works as an at-will employee
for a private company and therefore cannot rely on an
employer’s promise against retaliatory conduct12—faces a stark
choice when considering whether to blow the proverbial whistle.
If the employee is concerned primarily with retaining her position
and avoiding other retaliatory action by her employer, she must
either remain silent, allowing the possible securities law violation
to go unaddressed, or she must externally report the potential
violation to the SEC.13 Although Dodd-Frank augments the
protections and incentives for would-be whistleblowers,14 this law
does not extend protection to employees of private companies who
limit disclosure to an internal audience.15 In order for employees
like Sullivan to invoke Dodd-Frank’s protection against retaliatory
action, they must externally disclose the impropriety to the SEC.16
7 See infra Part III.
8 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2013).
9 See infra Part I.
10 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1571 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 83b-3(b) (2012)).
11 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(a) (2012); see infra Part II.
12 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 915 N.Y.S.2d 514, 517–18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010),
aff ’d, 969 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 2012).
13 See infra Part II.
14 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2–F-3.
15 See infra Part II. As an employee for a private company, Sullivan was not
eligible for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection, which provides whistleblowers
with a private cause of action in the event they incur retaliatory action after internally
reporting fraudulent activity. See Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806 116 Stat. 802–04 (2002) [hereinafter
SOX] (adding Section 1514A to 18 U.S.C.); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 10 CIV. 8202
LBS, 2011 WL 1672066 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F.
16 See Egan, 2011 WL 1672066. There, the court held as a matter of first
impression that, because the plaintiff ’s disclosure did fall within one of the few
statutory exceptions, “the anti-retaliation whistleblower protection provisions of the
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The Sullivan decision and current securities laws strip from the
employee’s consideration the sensible option of limiting disclosure
to a supervisor or the firm’s internal compliance program.
This note examines the effect Sullivan v. Harnisch has
on securities-related disclosure among private investment
advisers in New York in a post Dodd-Frank world. Depending on
one’s vantage point, the combination of federal securities laws
and the holding of Sullivan v. Harnisch either promotes a policy
of external disclosure—one facilitating adherence to securities
laws—or it further skews employee incentives to stay silent,
one promoting an ineffective method of compliance enforcement.
Although these incentives may promote the enforcement goals of
the SEC,17 they may also run counter to the motivations and
considerations of would-be whistleblowers.18 The goal of policy-
makers should be to craft a policy that creates the most efficient
mechanism to ensure compliance with securities laws. In order to
achieve this result, either New York or federal policy must change
so that employees are protected if they choose to limit disclosure
of a possible securities law violation to an internal audience.
Because the current paradigm pushing employees to make
external disclosure arises from a combination of state and federal
policies, many sources for a potential solution exist. Companies
can create and promote strong compliance programs—systems
that proscribe retaliation or that preserve anonymity.19 Further,
Congress could amend Dodd-Frank to forbid retaliation for
internally reporting violations among all financial companies.20
Finally, although perhaps unlikely,21 New York courts could
adapt existing common law to protect internal disclosure. In
Wieder v. Skala,22 the court recognized the role self-policing plays
Dodd-Frank Act require Plaintiff to show that he . . . provided information to the SEC.”
Id. at *7; see infra Part II.
17 See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 97 (Aug. 12, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf; see also SEC OFFICE OF
THE WHISTLEBLOWER, http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Jan. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions] (“Assistance and information
from a whistleblower who knows of possible securities law violations can be among the most
powerful weapons in the law enforcement arsenal of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.”).
18 See infra Part IV.
19 See infra Part IV.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 “American courts, including our own, ‘have proved chary of creating common-
law exceptions to the rule and reluctant to expand any exceptions once fashioned.’”
Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. 2012) (quoting Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790
N.E.2d 753, 755 (N.Y. 2003)).
22 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
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in the legal profession and carved out the only exception to its at-
will employment doctrine for an attorney who was fired after
attempting to discipline a colleague.23 By augmenting established
contractual principles with this policy of self-regulation, New
York courts can establish a framework that protects employees
who make internal disclosure without significantly undermining
its at-will employment doctrine. Employees should have the
option of limiting disclosure of potential securities law violations
to an internal audience. And although the adoption of a new
common law policy would, in certain circumstances, infringe upon
an employer’s right to discharge employees, establishing these
legal protections would foster internal disclosure and improve a
firm’s ability to maintain effective compliance programs.
Part I of this note will focus on New York common law
and the statute relevant to would-be whistleblowers of private
companies. This section will review Sullivan v. Harnisch as well
as other cases to reveal the current contours of New York’s at-will
employment doctrine. This section will also address New York’s
whistleblower statute and the difficulty one would face trying to
invoke its protections in the context of reporting securities law
violations. Part II will explore the impact of Dodd-Frank,
emphasizing the heightened regulatory standards imposed upon
most private investment advisers. This section will also explore
the implementation of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections
and the related SEC rules. Part III will juxtapose New York’s
employment and whistleblower policies with Dodd-Frank. This
juxtaposition will demonstrate how all roads now point to
external disclosure and how such a path may not align with the
behavior of employees or the compliance interests of employers.
Part IV will assess possible remedies, including those that would
extend anti-retaliatory protections to employees that engage in
internal disclosure.
I. NEW YORK’S COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY
PROTECTIONS AGAINST RETALIATORY TERMINATION
In order to understand how the combination of current
federal and state policies pushes an employee of a private
investment adviser to externally disclose potential securities
law violations, one must first understand the protection
against retaliatory employer conduct, or lack thereof, offered
to employees by New York law. To do so, the contours of New
23 Id. at 108–09.
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York’s at-will employment doctrine and its whistleblower
statute must be explored.
A. New York’s Common Law Provides Little Help
1. Sullivan v. Harnisch
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
internal disclosure of alleged hedge fund improprieties in
Sullivan v. Harnisch.24 Joseph Sullivan was a 15% partner of
Peconic and bore many titles at the firm, such as Chief Compliance
Officer, Executive Vice President, and Chief Operating Officer.25
Sullivan alleged he was fired days after confronting William
Harnisch, Peconic’s CEO, over Harnisch’s alleged “manipulative
and deceptive trading practices”26 known as “front-running,”
where one “[takes] advantage of investment opportunities that
should first be accorded to its clients.”27
In his appeal, Sullivan asserted that he was required to
disclose trading activity that ran afoul of federal securities
laws and the firm’s internal code of ethics.28 Sullivan argued
that his objection to the misconduct was improper grounds for
termination.29 The court rejected Sullivan’s position and reaffirmed
its staunch adherence to New York’s at-will employment doctrine.30
Without a finding of breach of contract, or a violation of Sullivan’s
statutory or constitutional rights, Harnisch and Peconic reserved
the right to fire Sullivan for any reason.31
The court also rebuffed Sullivan’s attempt to invoke the
only judicially recognized exception to New York’s at-will
employment doctrine.32 This exception, espoused in Wieder v.
24 Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d 758.
25 Id. at 759.
26 Id.
27 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 915 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010),
aff ’d, 969 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 2012). Harnisch sold two-thirds of a personal $100 million
position in Potash Corp.—a security also held in his clients’ funds—days before the
release of a disappointing earnings report from a related company. Id. at 516. Harnisch
did not execute similar trades on behalf of his clients until after the release of the
earnings report. Id. As a result, Harnisch pocketed $132 per share whereas the funds
earned $103 per share. According to Sullivan, this practice violated Peconic’s SEC
filings and its internal compliance manual. Id. at 517.
28 Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 759.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 760.
32 Id. at 760–61; see Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992)
(discussed infra Part I).
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Skala,33 recognized a breach of contract based upon an implied
obligation where an attorney, bound by his professional
responsibilities, was fired after insisting that a colleague face
disciplinary action for malpractice.34 The court in Sullivan noted
that Sullivan’s compliance duties at Peconic were not “so closely
linked [to his position] as to be incapable of separation,” or that
compliance was not “at the very core, and indeed, the only purpose
of Sullivan’s employment.”35 In dissent, Chief Judge Lippman
opined that “the majority unwisely limits the exception to the at-
will employment . . . . In so doing, it creates a great potential for
abuse in the financial services industry.”36
Although never raised by the parties or the court, Sullivan’s
conduct was not protected by New York’s whistleblower statute.37
And although Sullivan’s termination occurred before the passage of
Dodd-Frank, the court observed that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
protections would have nevertheless been inapplicable.38
2. The Confines of New York’s Common Law
The court’s decision in Sullivan v. Harnisch represents
one of the latest in a line of decisions that express New York’s at-
will employment doctrine as highly deferential to the judgment
and decisions of employers. The cases that follow articulate the
contours of New York’s at-will employment doctrine. As they
demonstrate, plaintiffs who allege that they were wrongfully
discharged without asserting a claim that is cognizable under a
contractual lens likely will fail in their lawsuit.
In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,39 however, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff brought a facially valid
breach of contract action after being fired.40 Walter Lewis Weiner,
a long-time employee of McGraw-Hill who steadily ascended
through the ranks there before being fired, successfully persuaded
the Court of Appeals that a provision in the McGraw-Hill’s
personnel handbook might have constituted an express promise
33 Wieder, 609 N.E.2d 105.
34 Id. at 110.
35 Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 761 (quoting Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 108 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
36 Id. at 765 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting).
37 See infra Part I.B.
38 Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 761 (“[Dodd-Frank] seems not to apply to conduct
like that alleged in Sullivan’s complaint; Sullivan does not claim to have blown a
whistle—i.e., to have told the SEC or anyone else outside Peconic about Harnisch’s
alleged misconduct—but only to have confronted Harnisch himself.”).
39 Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
40 Id. at 443.
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within his employment contract.41 The employee handbook
limited termination to instances where there was “just and
sufficient cause.”42 The company’s application for employment
stipulated that Weiner’s “employment [was] subject to the
provisions of [the handbook].”43 These factors, along with
Weiner’s alleged reliance on this for-cause provision as a basis
for working for McGraw-Hill and the employer’s prior insistence
that Weiner adhere to the corporate policy when faced with
staffing decisions, led the court to conclude that Weiner
articulated a legitimate question of whether McGraw-Hill had
breached a contract it held with Weiner.44
In Murphy v. American Home Products Corporation,45
the court considered two separate causes of action that, when
combined, form the spine of the single claim considered by the
Sullivan court. Plaintiff Joseph Murphy alleged that he was
terminated after internally disclosing accounting improprieties
that resulted in an overstatement of the firm’s earnings.46 These
overstatements allegedly enabled the firm’s management to
receive “unwarranted” bonuses.47 Murphy raised several causes
of action, including one sounding in wrongful, retaliatory
termination and another in breach of an implied employment
contract.48 In addressing Murphy’s retaliatory discharge claim,
the court concluded that whether a wrongful termination cause
of action should be created was a matter reserved for “a
principled statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public
ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial resolution of
the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants.”49
Murphy also argued that “he was required by the terms of his
employment to disclose accounting improprieties” and that by
his termination, his employer breached the implied “obligation
on the part of the employer to deal with . . . employees fairly” that
41 Id. at 442–43, 45
42 Id. at 442. The pertinent text of the personnel handbook read:
[t]he company will resort to dismissal for just and sufficient cause only, and only
after all practical steps toward rehabilitation or salvage of the employee have been
taken and failed. However, if the welfare of the company indicates that dismissal is
necessary, then that decision is arrived at and is carried out forthrightly.
Id. (alteration in original).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 445–46.
45 Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d, 86 (N.Y. 1983).
46 Id. at 87.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 89, 91.
49 Id. at 90.
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permeates all employment contracts.50 Finding no precedent to
support this proposition and wary of its broad policy implications,
the court rejected Murphy’s argument and held that whether an
employer’s right to terminate an at-will employment should be
infringed is a matter best left to the legislature.51
The only judicially recognized exception to New York’s at-
will employment doctrine was espoused in Wieder v. Skala.52
Howard Wieder, an associate at a law firm, reported to his
supervising partners the “false and fraudulent material
misrepresentations” a colleague attorney made in an effort to
conceal his negligence in handling a real estate transaction for
Wieder.53 Wieder, who at that time claimed he spearheaded the
firm’s most important litigation project, insisted that his firm
pursue disciplinary action against his colleague before the New
York Appellate Division Disciplinary Committee.54 He
abandoned this request after his supervisors threatened to fire
him.55 That action, apparently, did not pacify Wieder’s employer;
he was fired soon after he submitted important filings related to
his litigation project.56
In review of his action for wrongful termination and
breach of contract, the court concluded that an exception to
New York’s at-will employment doctrine was warranted. The
court noted “the unique function of self-regulation belonging to
the legal profession”57 and the “essential compact that in
conducting the firm’s legal practice both plaintiff and the firm
would do so in compliance with the prevailing rules of conduct
and ethical standards of the profession.”58 In its analysis, the
court placed great emphasis on the fact that, as an attorney,
Wieder’s conduct was governed by a code of professional
responsibility.59 The code, in pertinent part, prohibits attorneys
from keeping secret unprivileged conduct or statements made by
another attorney that would impeach that attorney’s integrity
and trustworthiness.60 The court held that the plaintiff stated a
50 Id. at 91.
51 Id.
52 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
53 Id. at 106.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 108.
58 Id. at 110.
59 Id. at 108–09.
60 Id. at 106 n.1; N.Y. COMP. CODESR.&REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 rule 8.3(a) (2012).
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valid breach of contract claim “based on an implied-in-law
obligation in his relationship with defendant.”61
B. New York’s Whistleblower Law Does Not Apply to
Financial Harms
Under New York’s whistleblower statute, an employee
who shares or threatens to share “an activity, policy or practice
of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation
which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety” is protected from
retaliatory action.62 The statute protects both internal and
external disclosure by a whistleblower.63
The application of New York’s whistleblower statute,
however, is limited. First, “the requirements of a violation and
a danger to health or safety are conjunctive, the statute does
not protect an employee who reports activity presenting such a
danger . . . if the activity does not violate a specific statute or
regulation.”64 Further, “[t]he law requires that there be . . . an
actual, as opposed to a possible, violation . . . . Reasonable belief
as a basis for protection under [New York’s whistleblower law]
will not suffice.”65 Finally, the jurisprudential interpretation of
New York’s whistleblower statute does not affiliate “corporate
wrongdoing or white-collar crimes” with the type of danger to the
public the law is intended to prevent.66 For example, in Clarke v.
TRW, Inc.,67 the court noted that a defective electrical relay
that could give rise to problems with an automobile’s brakes or
fuel pump qualified as a harm covered by New York’s
whistleblower law.68 In Susman v. Commerzbank Capital Markets
Corp.,69 on the other hand, the court affirmed a lower court’s
dismissal of a state whistleblower claim because the firm’s alleged
61 Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 110.
62 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2013).
63 Id.
64 Sandra J. Mullings, Is There Whistleblower Protection for Private Employees
in New York?, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 36 (1997).
65 Remba v. Fed’n Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 545 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989), aff ’d, 559 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1990).
66 Silvia X. Liu, Note, When Doing the Right Thing Means Losing Your Job:
Reforming the New York Whistleblower Statute, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 61, 71 (2004). Liu
argues, among other things, that New York’s whistleblower statute should be amended
such that “an employee should be protected if she or he reasonably believes that a
violation of the law, rule or regulation has occurred or is occurring.” Id. at 64.
67 Clarke v. TRW, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 927 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
68 Id. at 935–36.
69 Susman v. Commerzbank Capital Mkts. Corp., 945 N.Y.S.2d 5 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2012), leave to appeal denied, 975 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 2012).
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illegality—engaging in transactions with the Central Bank of
Iran, a federally proscribed activity—did not constitute a
“substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.”70
As one court noted, “financial improprieties [are not] placed on
the same plane as threats to public health or safety.”71 One
justification for this distinction was to “avoid the cumulative
effect of a potential flood of lawsuits seeking to convert ordinary
employment disputes into ‘whistle-blower’ protection cases.”72
In sum, neither New York’s common law nor its
whistleblower statute extend protection against retaliatory conduct
to an employee who makes internal disclosure about a potential
securities law violation. The tools exist, however, for New York
courts presented with these circumstances to craft a common law
remedy against retaliatory conduct.
II. DODD-FRANK’S IMPACT—PRIVATE INVESTMENT ADVISER
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS ANDWHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS
A. Hedge Fund Compliance Requirements
Prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, hedge funds and other
private investment advisers largely avoided SEC registration and
the Commission’s direct oversight by taking advantage of Section
203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.73 This provision
extended a registration exemption for certain investment advisers
with fewer than 15 clients in the preceding year.74 The D.C.
Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC 75 molded the shape of this exemption
and determined that the term “clients” referred to the “advising of
70 Id. at 7.
71 McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) supplemented, 92 CIV. 8132 (VLB), 1993 WL 525127 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1993)
(declining to extend New York state whistleblower protections to an employee that was
fired after internally reporting financial improprieties). The plaintiff submitted a five-
pound complaint but the court determined that it neither established a continuing fraud
or a “hazard to health or safety which has not been remedied by [the employer].” Id.
72 Id. at 1046.
73 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act
Amendments to Investment Advisers Act, 2 (June 22, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm [hereinafter SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act
Amendments].
74 Seth Chertok, A Detailed Analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 6 (2011). Additionally, to
qualify for the exemption, funds could not “hold themselves out to the public as
investment advisers, and [could] neither act[ ] as an investment adviser to any registered
investment company, nor to a company which has elected to be a ‘business development
company.’” Id.
75 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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pooled investment vehicles rather than the individual investors
therein.”76 This statutory interpretation allowed a hedge fund,
regardless of the number of its investors, to avoid registration so
long as it managed less than 15 funds.77
Title IV of Dodd-Frank in large part eliminated this
exemption for large private investment advisers.78 Noting that
“their trades can move markets,”79 Congress determined that
“information regarding [a private investment adviser’s] size,
strategies, and positions could be crucial to regulatory attempts
to deal with a future crisis.”80 Consequently, as of March 2012,
large private investment advisers must now comply with the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.81 This change resulted in a large
increase in the number of registered investment advisers,
expanding the number of firms regulated by the SEC.82
Registered private investment advisers must draft a code of ethics
that, among other things, include “[p]rovisions requiring [the
firm’s] supervised persons to comply with applicable Federal
securities laws”83 and “[p]rovisions requiring supervised persons
to report any violations of [the firm’s] code of ethics promptly to
[the firm’s] chief compliance officer or, provided [the firm’s] chief
compliance officer also receives reports of all violations, to other
persons . . . designate[d] in [the firm’s] code of ethics.”84 A registered
private investment adviser must also maintain “books and records”
that, among other things, record employee violations of the firm’s
code of ethics and the remedial actions taken in response.85 These
firms must also appoint a chief compliance officer86 and create
76 Chertok, supra note 74, at 8.
77 SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments, supra note 73, at 2; S. Rep. No.
111-176, at 73 (2010).
78 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1571 (2010).
79 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 38 (2010).
80 Id. at 72.
81 SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments, supra note 73. Dodd-Frank
created three new exemptions for private advisers. “Certain foreign advisers without a
place of business in the U.S.,” private advisers that only oversee venture capital funds,
and advisers to only private funds “with less than $150 million in assets under
management in the U.S.,” are exempt from SEC registration. Id. at 3.
82 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, More Than 1,500 Private Fund Advisers
Registered With the SEC Since Passage of the Financial Reform Law; SEC Notifies
Advisers Who Have Not Yet Moved to State Regulation (Oct. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-214.htm.
83 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
84 Id. at § 275.204A-1(a)(4) (emphasis added). Hedge Funds must further
include in their code of ethics a standard of conduct that reflects the firm’s and
employees’ fiduciary standards, the disclosure by employees and the review by
supervisors of all “personal securities transactions,” and provisions requiring the written
confirmation by employees confirming the receipt of the code. Id. §§ 275.204A-1(a).
85 Id. at § 275.204–2(a)(12)(ii).
86 Id. at § 275.206(4)–7(c).
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policies and procedures that are “reasonably designed to prevent
violation[s] . . . of the [Investment Advisers] Act.”87
B. Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
Federal securities law does not extend protection to
employees of private financial companies who make internal
disclosure of a possible securities law violation. Dodd-Frank
altered the scheme of incentives for would-be whistleblowers, but
it failed to add protections for certain internal disclosures. In
addition to augmenting the registration requirements for
private investment advisers, Section 922 of Dodd-Frank added
Section 21(F), titled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections,” to the Securities and Exchange Act 1934.88 This new
provision builds upon and incorporates existing whistleblower
protections promulgated by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX).89 Under SOX,
which passed in 2002 in the wake of the collapse of publicly
traded firms like Enron and WorldCom,90 employees of a
publicly traded company91 are protected against retaliatory actions
taken by their employer for disclosing potential fraud.92 SOX
protects employees whether they externally disclose the
perceived fraud to federal authorities or internally report the
issue to their immediate supervisors.93 Finally, SOX provides a
87 Id. at § 275.206(4)–7(a).
88 Corporate Law—Securities Regulation—Congress Expands Incentives for
Whistleblowers To Report Suspected Violations to the SEC—Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010), 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1829, 1831 (2011)
[hereinafterWhistleblower Incentives]; see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922,
124 Stat. 1842–49 (2010) (adding Section 21(F), “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections,” to Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
89 Joel D. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights and Protections: Critiquing Federal
Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing Pieces to Form a Beautiful
Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51, 105 (2011) (“In many ways, the Dodd-Frank
Act supersedes SOX because it expands protections.”).
90 Elisabeth Bumiller, CORPORATE CONDUCT: THE PRESIDENT; Bush
Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud In Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/business/corporate-conduct-the-president-bush-signs-
bill-aimed-at-fraud-in-corporations.html.
91 See SOX, Pub. L. No. 107204, § 806, 116 Stat. 802–04 (2002) (adding Section
1514A to 18 U.S.C.). SOX’s whistleblower covers employees of publicly traded companies,
its contractors, subcontractors and “any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial
information is included in [the company’s] consolidated financial statements.” Id. Section
929A of Dodd-Frank expanded SOX protections to include subsidiaries. Dodd-Frank Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929A, 124 Stat. 1852 (2010) (amending 18. U.S.C. § 1514A).
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (“No company [that is publicly traded] . . . may
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee . . . because of any lawful act done by the employee—(1) to provide
information . . . regarding any conduct the employee reasonably believes constitutes a
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private cause of action to whistleblowers that incur retaliatory
action; those who bring suit are eligible to recover compensatory
damages, including reinstatement, back pay with interest, and
compensation for any special damages.94
Unlike SOX’s whistleblower protections, Dodd-Frank’s
provisions incentivize whistleblowing-employees in both publicly
traded and private companies.95 Under Dodd-Frank, an individual
is a whistleblower if she provides information to the SEC about a
possible violation of securities laws that “has occurred, is ongoing,
or is about to occur.”96 The SEC interprets the term “possible
violation” as embodying a requirement that the violation be
potentially actionable.97 Therefore, the information provided to
the SEC cannot be frivolous but must have a “facially plausible
relationship to some securities law violation.”98
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions also extend anti-
retaliation protection to whistleblowers.99 An employer may not
take any retaliatory action—including threats, demotion,
harassment, termination, or suspension—if a whistleblower
provides to the SEC information about a possible securities law
violation; assists the SEC, through testifying or helping in its or
a judicial investigation; or makes “disclosures that are required
or protected under [SOX, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
including 10A(m) of such Act,] and any other law, rule or
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”100
A close reading of the anti-retaliatory provisions
indicates that unless one works for a publicly traded company—
and is thus protected under SOX’s anti-retaliatory measures—
one must report the possible securities law violation to the
SEC.101 The SEC rules stipulate that those who seek to avail
themselves of Dodd-Frank’s retaliatory protection must have a
reasonable belief, “one that a similarly situated employee might
reasonably possess,”102 that a possible securities law violation has,
violation of . . . any rule or regulation of the [SEC], . . . when the information . . . is
provided to . . . (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee . . . ”).
94 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(c)(2).
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2 (2012).
97 See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 17, at 15 n.31.
98 Id. at 13.
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b)(iii).
100 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
101 Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 17, at 18
(“[T]he retaliation protections for internal reporting afforded by [15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)] do not broadly apply to employees of entities other than public companies.”);
see also Whistleblower Incentives, supra note 88, at 1834.
102 Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 17, at 16.
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is, or will occur and they must provide the information to the SEC
through certain prescribed methods.103 However, so long as
whistleblowers do not offer a frivolous tip, they are protected
under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliatory provisions regardless of
whether the submitted information leads to a successful SEC
enforcement action.104 Like SOX, Dodd-Frank extends a private
cause of action to whistleblowers that suffer retaliatory action
by their employers.105
In addition to extending anti-retaliatory protection to
whistleblowers, Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions include
significant monetary incentives to encourage disclosure of possible
violations.106 Lawmakers “[r]ecogniz[ed] that whistleblowers
often face the difficult choice between telling the truth and the
risk of committing ‘career suicide’.”107 If one provides original
information108 about a possible securities law violation to the
SEC that, in turn, leads to a successful enforcement action
yielding for the SEC a recovery of over one million dollars, the
whistleblower who provided the information is entitled to receive
a qui tam109 award between 10% and 30% of the total amount
recovered by the SEC.110 These large awards are important,
because they are “what it takes to have an employee risk
everything.”111 Whistleblowers do not have to provide the
damning information to their employer to be eligible for the
award. Instead, one’s participation in an internal compliance
program is taken into account as a factor by the SEC when
deciding whether to increase a whistleblower’s total award.112
103 17 C.F.R § 240.21F-2(b)(i); see “Procedures for Submitting Original Information”
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9 (a whistleblower must either submit their information online through
the SEC’s website or send the SEC, viamail or fax, a Form TCR (Tip, Complaint, or Referral)).
104 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b)(iii).
105 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(B)(i).
106 See id. at § 78u-6(b).
107 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 111 (2010); see also Paul Sullivan, The Price Whistle-
Blowers Pay For Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/22/your-money/for-whistle-blowers-consider-the-risks-wealth-matters.html.
108 Original information is information “derived from independent knowledge
or analysis . . . ; is not known to the Commission from any other source, unless the
whistleblower is the original source . . . ; and is not exclusively derived from an
allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a
source of the information.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3).
109 “An action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a
penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will also
receive.” BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
110 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
111 Sullivan, supra note 107 (quoting Stephen M. Kohn, whistleblower attorney).
112 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a) (2012). Other factors that may affect the size of
the bounty include the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower,
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To further incentivize whistleblower participation in their
employer’s internal compliance apparatus, the SEC’s rules
include a “look back provision,” which retroactively applies the
date the whistleblowers informed their compliance department
as the date of the SEC submission.113
Whether an employee who internally discloses a potential
securities law violation is protected under federal law depends
on the nature of the company for whom the employee works. In
this context, an employee of a privately owned hedge fund like
Sullivan is left without any federally prescribed recourse.
III. CONFLUENCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICYHELP
NEITHER EMPLOYEESNOR EMPLOYERS
A. Policy Juxtaposition—New York and Dodd-Frank
The intersection of New York law and Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblowing provisions leave those who work for New York-
based private investment advisers with few options to safely
disclose a possible securities law violation.114 To receive federal
protection, one must first statutorily qualify. In the case of SOX,
one must be an employee of a publicly traded company.115
Under Dodd-Frank, employees of a private investment adviser
must externally disclose an impropriety to the SEC to avail
themselves of the law’s anti-retaliatory protection.116
Further, neither New York’s whistleblower statute nor
its at-will employment doctrine protect employees who make
disclosures regarding possible securities law violations from
retaliatory conduct.117 As noted above, New York’s courts typically
the level of assistance the whistleblower provided to the SEC, and whether the SEC
seeks to deter similar firm behavior in the future. Id.
113 Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 17, at 89-90
(“[A] whistleblower who first reports to an entity’s internal whistleblower, legal, or
compliance procedures for reporting allegations of possible violations of law and within
120 days reports to the Commission could be an eligible whistleblower whose
submission is measured as if it had been made at the earlier internal reporting date.”).
114 See supra Part I.A-B.
115 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). SOX’s whistleblower covers employees of
publicly traded companies, its contractors, subcontractors and “any subsidiary or
affiliate whose financial information is included in [the company’s] consolidated
financial statements.” Id.
116 See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 10 CIV. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). (“[Unless the statutory exceptions apply,] the anti-
retaliation whistleblower protection provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act require Plaintiff
to show that he . . . provided information to the SEC . . . .”); see also Whistleblower
Incentives, supra note 88, at 1834.
117 See supra Part I.
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analyze at-will employment disputes under a contractual
framework. Unless the employer has borne an express obligation
to refrain from arbitrarily terminating an employee118 or, and in
only very narrow circumstances, there exists some type of
implied obligation of self-regulation,119 “an employer’s right at
any time to terminate an employment at will remains
unimpaired.”120 New York’s whistleblower statute, too, provides
little comfort to those who detect, and seek to internally disclose,
a securities law violation. Courts sustain actions brought under
New York’s whistleblower statute only in a context of protecting
the public from tangible dangers, such as health and safety
emergencies.121 Even though financial scandals will continue to
threaten the economic health of New Yorkers, New York’s
whistleblower statute does not apply to protect those that disclose
financial or securities-related infractions.122
Without any state protections, New York employees like
Sullivan—those who work for a private company in the financial
services industry—must look to federal law for protection. “Dodd-
Frank has created a two-tiered structure of protections where
potential whistleblowers receive different sets of protections
depending on whether they chose to report internally or
externally.”123 Employees of publicly traded companies—those
subject to SOX—who disclose possible securities law violations
receive anti-retaliatory protection regardless of whether the
recipient of the disclosure is the whistleblower’s boss or the
SEC.124 Employees of private companies that are not subject to
SOX, such as Peconic, however “receive no protection if they
report internally.”125
118 See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 442 (N.Y. 1982).
119 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
120 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. 2012) (citations omitted).
121 See, e.g., Clarke v. TRW, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 927, 931, 935 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting, among other things, that a defective electrical relay that could affect car’s
brakes or fuel pump constituted “a specific and substantial risk to the health and
safety of the public”); Liu, supra note 66, at 71.
122 See, e.g., Remba v. Fed’n Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 559 N.E.2d 655, 655
(N.Y. 1990) (“Fraudulent billing—is not the type of violation which creates a
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.”); see also Susman v.
Commerzbank Capital Markets Corp., 945 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012), leave to
appeal denied 975 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 2012) (federally prohibited financial activities are not
covered under New York’s whistleblower umbrella); Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of
New York, 548 N.Y.S.2d 513, 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that purported violations of
N. Y. banking laws does not constitute the type of harm New York’s whistleblower statute is
intended to prevent).
123 Whistleblower Incentives, supra note 88, at 1834.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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B. Confluence of State and Federal Policies May Not Align
with Whistleblower Motives
Internal disclosure should be promoted and protected. Not
only is internal disclosure arguably easier for an employee, it is
often the first course of action for those that detect that something
may be wrong. The confluence of federal and state policies—the
“all roads point to the SEC” framework—may not align with the
best interests and motivations of most whistleblowers. Although a
significant number of whistleblowers state that they incurred
retaliatory actions by their employer, including termination in
many instances,126 the majority of whistleblowers who ultimately
pursue qui tam bounties, such as the one offered under Dodd-
Frank, first reported the matter internally to their employer.127
These employees generally do not rely on employer hotlines,
where confidentiality is preserved, but instead report a problem to
their supervisor.128 In fact, one study suggests that only one in six
employees who first reported a matter internally decided to later
disclose the potential violation to regulators.129 The same study
suggests that only three percent of whistleblowers pursue
external disclosure as a first course of action.130
This reluctance to publicly “blow the whistle” may be
understandable as public disclosure can carry with it a heavy
financial and emotional cost.131 Even after the passage of SOX,
approximately 40% of employees in one survey stated that they
remained silent upon detecting a problem, opting not to share
the matter with anyone in their firm.132 This behavior may
126 Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-at-
Will Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L.
REV. 543, 545-46 (2004) (citing a report by the National Whistleblower’s Center).
127 Stephen Martin Kohn, Amended Remarks, The Impact of Qui Tam
Whistleblower Rewards On Internal Compliance, 41 in Michael D. Greenberg, FOR
WHOM THE WHISTLE BLOWS: ADVANCING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND INTEGRITY
EFFORTS IN THE ERA OF DODD-FRANK (RAND, 2011). Kohn, Executive Director of the
National Whistleblower Center, noted that “[i]n cases under the False Claims
Act . . . [e]mpirical data show that approximately 90 percent of employees who filed a
qui tam case initially reported their concerns internally.” Id.
128 Id. at 42. Kohn, Executive Director of the National Whistleblower Center,
cites a report from the Ethics Resource Center. Id. See Blowing the Whistle on
Workplace Misconduct, ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER (Dec. 2010), http://www.ethics.org/
files/u5/WhistleblowerWP.pdf.
129 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER; A
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 8 (2012),
http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/reportingFinal.pdf
130 Id. at 19.
131 Sullivan, supra note 107 (collecting opinions of prominent whistleblower
attorneys).
132 Kohn, supra note 127, at 42.
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make sense as a different study questioning financial service
professionals indicated that only 35% of respondents believed
that their firm would not take retaliatory action.133 Additionally,
the reward one may eventually receive through a bounty
program and a successful lawsuit may not fully compensate the
whistleblower.134 In addition to lost wages from being fired,
whistleblowers will become pariahs in their field and will likely
struggle to find similar work.135
Although Joseph Sullivan limited disclosure to Peconic’s
CEO,136 his rationale for doing so may not be representative of
the would-be whistleblower. At the time of the alleged trading
improprieties, Sullivan and Harnisch were embroiled in an
ownership dispute regarding a partnership agreement that
“would have eliminated Sullivan’s ownership interest” in
Peconic.137 Harnisch fired Sullivan the same day Sullivan’s
attorney contacted Peconic to discuss the agreement.138 Although
this context may have colored the court’s impression of
Sullivan’s claim, the fact remains that an employee of a private
investment adviser that limits disclosure to an internal audience
is not protected against employer retaliation.
C. Confluence of State and Federal Polices May Not Align
with Employers’ Interests
In addition to failing to protect the natural behavior of the
common employee, neither federal nor state whistleblower policies
adequately align with employers’ interests. While Peconic may
have won the litigation battle in Sullivan v. Harnisch, the ruling
may cause private investment advisers in New York to lose ground
in the compliance war. Many commentators and practitioners of
the corporate bar bemoaned the SEC’s final whistleblower rules as
creating a system that overly incentivizes whistleblowers to make
external disclosure and, at the same time, one that undermines a
firm’s ability to self-police.139 Although these points of concern arose
133 LABATON SUCHAROW, WALL STREET FLEET STREET MAIN STREET: CORPORATE
INTEGRITY AT A CROSSROADS; US & UK FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY SURVEY 6 (2012),
available at http://www.labaton.com/en/about/press/upload/US-UK-Financial-Services-
Industry-Survey-July-2012-Report.pdf.
134 Sullivan, supra note 107.
135 Id.
136 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 761 (N.Y. 2012).
137 Id. at 759.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Stein to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Re
Proposed Rules For Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—File No. S7-33-10 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
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in a national debate concerning the implementation of federal
legislation, they remain equally potent—and perhaps the predicted
effects by these commentators become compounded—when
assessed under a local, New York-based lens.
With the release of the final rules implementing Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower provisions, the SEC believes that it
“charted a Solomonic middle ground in an attempt to prevent
harming companies’ internal compliance programs while also not
putting up too many obstacles for whistleblowers to overcome.”140
While noting the value of internal compliance programs, the SEC
also observed that, at times, these programs “cannot serve as
adequate substitutes for our obligation to identify and remedy
violations of the federal securities laws.”141 The whistleblower
program, according to the SEC, the whistleblower program
“encourages the whistleblower to report allegations internally,
yet ultimately and appropriately leaves that decision to the
whistleblower.”142
Companies, as can be imagined, disagree with the SEC’s
final rules. Many fear that the bounty program, which grants an
award to the whistleblower of up to 30% of any SEC recovery
exceeding one million dollars,143 will inhibit “well-meaning,
compliant” firms from investigating and rectifying compliance
issues internally.144 “The ability to bypass pre-existing internal
procedures for reporting wrongdoing also may limit the role of
internal investigations in future enforcement actions by inhibiting
companies from conducting such investigations before the
government becomes involved.”145 Others believe that internal
disclosure should not be a factor that augments an award but,
rather, should be “a prerequisite to recovery by an employee-
whistleblower.”146 Without setting internal disclosure as a
precondition to recovery, companies fear that the “bounty
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-148.pdf; Letter from James Moore, Exec.
Vice President, Gen. Counsel and Corporate Compliance Officer, Huntsman Corp., to Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-
ix/whistleblower/whistleblower-74.pdf.
140 Michael E. Clark, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Bounty Hunter Provisions, 44 No. 3
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 31, 38 (2011), available at http://documents.jdsupra.com/
e557167e-8ac7-417b-b7d9-e1119ef8df43.pdf.
141 Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 17, at 237.
142 Id.
143 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)-(b) (2012).
144 Letter from James Moore, supra note 139.
145 Michael Delikat and Renée Phillips, Internal Investigations After Dodd-
Frank, in CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE SARBANES-OXLEY/DODD-FRANK ERA
§ 11:2.1 (Practising Law Institute 2013).
146 Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Stein, supra note 139.
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program will . . . drive companies to view all compliance matters
equally—as matters of potentially severe consequence, given the
increased risk of regulatory intervention.”147 Not only will this
lead to an inefficient allocation of compliance resources, as
companies would have to probe a potentially catastrophic matter
with the same vigor as a frivolous issue, it may also compel
companies to self-report to the SEC all matters to avoid its
employees from whistleblowing, thereby flooding the SEC with
problems and unnecessarily tarnishing the reputation of firms.148
Although the current Dodd-Frank whistleblowing
paradigm encourages external whistleblowing, the lack of state
protection for internal disclosure demands external disclosure
from employees of New York private investment advisers. The
problem is not that Dodd-Frank over-incentivizes would-be
whistleblowers, as some commentators have suggested,149 but
rather that, at least in New York, public disclosure is the only
way in which an employee of this firm type can guarantee legal
protection against retaliatory action. This confluence of state and
federal policies places undue pressure on employees who seek to
report a potential violation and deprives employers of a
meaningful opportunity to self-police securities compliance.
IV. REMEDIES
Under the current paradigm created by the confluence of
Dodd-Frank and New York’s policies, those employed by New
York private investment advisers with knowledge of a potential
securities law violation are stuck between a rock and a hard
place. To preserve their jobs, these employees face the choice of
doing nothing, which may cause a problem to fester, or taking
the risky path of disclosing a violation to the SEC. Changes to
either New York or federal policies are necessary to efficiently
balance the interests of employees, employers, and society.
Fortunately, there are several possible remedies available to
companies, policy makers, and the courts. The menu of available
cures is divided into two parts. First, there are private remedies;
steps that firms can take to induce and promote internal
disclosure. Second, there are public remedies; measures
policymakers and the courts can pursue to extend legal
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Jenny Lee, Note, Corporate Corruption & The New Gold Mine; How the
Dodd-Frank Act Overincentivizes Whistleblowing, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 303, 339 (2011).
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protections to those who, but for the fear of retaliatory action, seek
to internally disclose possible securities law violations.
A. Private Remedy: Establishing Strong Compliance
Policies
In light of Dodd-Frank’s significant incentives to
externally disclose possible securities law violations, many
commentators and practitioners recommend that firms establish
strong compliance programs that provide employees with “a
visibly safe pathway” for internal disclosures.150 “The occurrence
of external whistleblowing . . . usually indicates not only the
failure in a firm’s commitment to morality but also a breakdown
in its ethical structure and communication channels.”151
Practitioners recommend that firms either establish written
policies that proscribe retaliatory action or provide employees
with a means to confidentially relay information regarding a
possible problem, and, in doing so, create a disclosure
infrastructure that makes it impossible for an employer to take
retaliatory action.152
The adoption of internal policies that facilitate confidential
internal disclosure and or proscribe retaliatory action is a strong
solution. These policies both align with whistleblower behavior
and an employer’s interest in maintaining strong compliance
programs. Although this remedy is attractive, it is not sufficient.
Widespread implementation of corporate policies that protect
internal disclosure cannot be guaranteed. The adoption of
internal policies, by its very definition, is firm dependent.
Society’s interest in compliant investment advisers may be better
served by the promulgation of a uniform floor of legal protection
upon which employees can stand, and not through ad-hoc
policies that likely vary among different firms.
150 Michael D. Greenberg, Corporate Integrity in the Wake of Dodd-Frank:
How Do We Fortify Internal Compliance, Reporting, and Culture? in FOR WHOM THE
WHISTLE BLOWS: ADVANCING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND INTEGRITY EFFORTS IN THE
ERA OFDODD-FRANK 23 (RAND, 2011) [hereinafter Corporate Integrity].
151 Cavico, supra note 126, at 623.
152 See Corporate Integrity, supra note 150, at 23–24.
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B. Public Remedies
1. Update Dodd-Frank
Perhaps the clearest cut remedy to protect internal
disclosure is to amend Dodd-Frank. Indeed, as some commentators
have noted, the inconsistency between SOX and Dodd-Frank
regarding anti-retaliatory protections for those who internally
disclose may be unintentional.153 This theory, however, is likely
misplaced, as the SEC definitively stated: “[T]he retaliation
protections for internal reporting afforded by [15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii)] do not broadly apply to employees of entities
other than public companies.”154 The SEC has further signaled
its intent that disclosure should be publicly made, noting,
“[I]nternal compliance programs are not substitutes for
rigorous law enforcement.”155
Courts, too, have recognized the bifurcation in anti-
retaliatory protection. Recent judicial interpretations of this area
of Dodd-Frank indicate that courts will not interpret the new law
so that anti-retaliation protection extends to employees of private
companies who pursue internal disclosure.156 In the first case to
review Dodd-Frank’s SEC whistleblower provisions,157 the court
compared the SEC’s whistleblower program and scope with a
different whistleblower program promulgated by Dodd-Frank
for the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB).158 The
court noted that the CFPB’s anti-retaliation provisions159 were
153 See, e.g., Hesch, supra note 89, at 105–06.
154 Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 17, at 18.
155 Id. at 97.
156 See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“The contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are best
harmonized by reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of certain
whistleblower disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow exception to
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the SEC.”).
In other words, unless an employee makes an internal disclosure protected or required
by SOX, the Securities Exchange Act, or “any other law, rule or regulation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission,” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), one must also
externally disclose the possible securities law violation in order to receive protection
from employer retaliation. Accord Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11-cv-01424, 2012
WL 4444820 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) (denying a motion to dismiss after finding that
an employee covered under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) who wrote a letter to the SEC
did not have to make a disclosure to the SEC for anti-retaliation protection and did not
need to adhere to the SEC procedures for submitting information).
157 Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *4.
158 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1) (2012).
159 The CFPB’s anti-relation provisions extend protection to those who disclose
possible violations under the agency’s jurisdiction “to the employer, the Bureau, or any
other State, local, or Federal, government authority or law enforcement agency.” 12
U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1); see also Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *4.
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broader than the SEC’s whistleblower provisions, “indicat[ing]
that Congress intended to encourage whistleblowers reporting
[securities] violations to report to the SEC.”160
One commentator has argued that amending Dodd-Frank
to incorporate SOX’s anti-retaliation protection for internal
disclosure within private firms “could certainly be one of the most
important [amendments aimed toward] fulfilling the investor
protection mission of Dodd-Frank and of the SEC in general.”161 In
fact, one proposed amendment to the SEC’s whistleblower
program has already been introduced before Congress.162 New
York Representative Michael Grimm introduced the
Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011.163 Under this proposed
legislation, whistleblowers must first disclose a possible violation
to their employer in order to maintain eligibility for an award
under Dodd-Frank’s bounty program.164 Grimm’s bill includes an
exception to this default rule and allows for recovery of an award
without internal disclosure when “the whistleblower alleges and
the Commission determines that the employer lacks either a policy
prohibiting retaliation for reporting potential misconduct or an
internal reporting system allowing for anonymous reporting.”165
This legislation has its sights fixed on Dodd-Frank’s
bounty program.166 The proposed bill, however, does not
adequately address the current disconnect among Dodd-Frank’s
and SOX’s anti-retaliatory protections. In effect, this proposal is
an unfair exchange as employers benefit at the expense of their
employees. The bill’s internal disclosure requirement addresses
firm’s concerns about the strength of their compliance programs
but the bill does not provide something of equal value, like
protection against retaliation, to employees.167
160 Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *4.
161 Whistleblower Incentives, supra note 88, at 1836 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
162 See Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R 2483, 112th Cong. (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2483ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2483ih.pdf.
163 Id.
164 Id. at § 2(a)(2)(A).
165 Id. at § 2(a)(2)(D).
166 See id. at § 2(b)(1–2) (eliminating a minimum award amount and amending
Dodd-Frank’s language such that the maximum award is capped but the minimum amount
is left to the SEC’s discretion); see also Dana Liebelson, New Bill to Weaken Protections,
Incentives for Whistleblowers Sneaks Through Committee, TRUTH-OUT.ORG (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://truth-out.org/news/item/6721:new-bill-to-weaken-protections-incentives-for-
whistleblowers-sneaks-through-committee.
167 See Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R 2483, 112th Cong. § 2.
The proposed legislation allows for external disclosure as a first course of action where
the employer does not have a policy proscribing retaliation but the proposed legislation
does not proscribe employer retaliation for internal disclosure. Id.
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2. Adapt New York Common Law
New York does not recognize a common law tort claim
for wrongful discharge,168 or a public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine.169 Where an employee is at-will,
“absent a constitutionally impermissible purpose, a statutory
proscription, or an express limitation in the individual contract
of employment, an employer’s right at any time to terminate an
employment at will remains unimpaired.”170 New York courts,
however, should recognize the effect the juxtaposition of its at-will
employment doctrine and Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions
have on employees and their respective employer’s compliance
program. Further, crafty plaintiffs should recognize that the
current jurisprudence of New York’s at-will employment doctrine,
when juxtaposed with the new requirements that Dodd-Frank
imposes upon private investment advisers, might afford a means of
obtaining protection from retaliatory termination.
As noted above, New York has carved one exception to its
strict at-will employment doctrine when it recognized a claim
sounding in breach of contract “based on an implied-in-law
obligation” in an action brought by an attorney against his
employer law firm.171 The exception, espoused in Wieder v. Skala,
is founded, in part, upon the principle that attorneys are a self-
regulating industry and are subject to a code of professional
responsibility.172 “Erecting . . . disincentives to compliance with
the applicable rules of professional conduct . . . would subvert the
central professional purpose of [an attorney’s] relationship with the
firm—the lawful and ethical practice of law.”173 In his dissent in
168 DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING, THE LAW
OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 357 (2d ed. BNA Books 2004); see also Gary Minda, Katie
R. Raab, Time For An Unjust Dismissal Statute In New York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137,
1139 (1989) (advocating for the adoption of a wrongful termination statute).
169 See Nadjia Limani, Note, Righting Wrongful Discharge: A Recommendation for
the New York Judiciary to Adopt A Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will
Doctrine, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 309, 336 (2006) (arguing that New York
should adopt a public policy exception modeled on various elements of other states’ public
policy exemption).
170 Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983).
171 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992).
172 Id. at 108 (“The particular rule of professional conduct implicated here (DR
1-103[A]), it must be noted, is critical to the unique function of self-regulation
belonging to the legal profession.”). DR 1-103[A], now codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 rule 8.3(a) (2012), states: “A lawyer who knows that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate
or act upon such violation.”
173 Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 108.
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Sullivan v. Harnisch, Chief Judge Lippman argued that theWieder
exception should apply to a hedge fund’s chief compliance officer.174
Just as in Wieder, Sullivan was “an employee of a business that
was subject to certain legal and ethical obligations to its clients
and his reason for being, as a compliance officer, was to ensure
that in providing services to those clients, those rules were
followed at all times.”175 If applied, the application of Judge
Lippman’s extension of the Wieder exception would cover only
those that were employed as compliance personnel for a private
investment adviser.176 And while the implementation of such a
policy would be a step in the right direction, it does not go far
enough as it leaves all other non-compliance employees without
meaningful protection against retaliatory conduct.
There may yet be hope for protecting non-compliance
personnel from retaliatory conduct. New York also recognizes an
action sounding in breach of express contract in cases involving
at-will employees where an employer’s handbook or written
policies prohibit arbitrary termination.177 In Weiner v. McGraw
Hill, the New York Court of Appeals held that a discharged at-
will employee had put forward a sufficient breach of contract
claim because an express obligation in the company’s handbook
prevented the employer from terminating him without sufficient
cause and “only after all practical steps toward rehabilitation or
salvage of the employee have been taken and failed.”178
If the principles of self-regulation and employee obligation
embedded in Wieder are combined with the contractual principles
ofWeiner, New York courts may be able to devise a way to extend
anti-retaliatory protection for employees of private investment
advisers while remaining generally adherent to New York’s
current at-will employment doctrine. Among other things, Dodd-
Frank requires newly registered private investment advisers to
create a code of ethics that must have “[p]rovisions requiring [the
firm’s] supervised persons to comply with applicable Federal
securities laws” and “[p]rovisions requiring supervised persons to
report any violations of your code of ethics promptly to your chief
compliance officer or, provided your chief compliance officer also
174 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 763–64 (N.Y. 2012) (Lippman,
C.J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 764.
176 Id. (“[W]here an employee is merely peripherally responsible for informing
his or her employer (or others) of violations of certain obligations, that person is
unlikely to be covered by the Wieder exception. This is not such a case.”).
177 Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
178 Id. at 442.
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receives reports of all violations, to other persons you designate in
your code of ethics.”179 In effect, these provisions place a duty on
private investment advisers to craft policies that require their
employees to internally report possible securities law violations.
An employee should be able to point to these provisions and argue
that they were obligated, pursuant to an express condition in
their code of ethics, to make internal disclosures.
Because, however, the provisions outlining the
requirements of a private investment adviser’s code of ethics do
not require a firm to put in place a policy proscribing retaliation
for internal disclosure, the court may not be satisfied that an
express obligation exists against which a breach of contract can be
established. “As has been observed, courts should not ‘infer a
contractual limitation on the employer’s right to terminate an at-
will employment absent an express agreement to that effect which
is relied upon by the employee.’”180 For example, in Lobosco v. New
York Tel. Co./NYNEX the court dismissed a breach of contract
claim raised by a terminated employee where the employer had a
code of conduct that both required employees to internally disclose
misconduct and provided assurances that retaliatory action would
not be taken as a result of disclosure.181 The same handbook,
however, contained an express disclaimer stating that the code of
conduct could not be interpreted as a contract.182
It is here, critically, where the courts should impute the
policy principles of Wieder. In Wieder, the court placed significant
weight on the idea that attorneys are subject to a code of
professional conduct.183 Both New York’s Rules of Professional
Conduct discussed in Wieder184 and the registration requirements
of Dodd-Frank impute a duty upon those that practice in their
respective fields to disclose possible violations. Unlike the policy
in Lobosco, the policies referenced in Wieder and required by
Dodd-Frank are universally applied across a profession. And
unlike a failure to adhere to a private corporate policy in
Lobosco, the failure by attorneys or securities professionals to
179 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(a) (2012). The Sullivan court did not focus on these
requirements but instead focused its attention on 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7, which
requires companies to appoint chief compliance officers and to create policies to prevent
violations of securities laws. Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 761.
180 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 915 N.Y.S.2d 514, 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), aff ’d,
969 N.E.2d 758 (2012) (quoting Chazen v. Person/Wolisky, Inc., 766 N.Y.S.2d 360, 360
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003)).
181 Lobosco v. New York Tel. Co./NYNEX, 751 N.E.2d 462, 465 (N.Y. 2001).
182 Id.
183 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108–09 (N.Y. 1992).
184 Id.
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abide by their respective universal policies could have a wide-
ranging, systemic impact.
Employees of private investment advisers are required to
abide by their code of ethics and disclose to their colleagues
potential securities law violations. Incurring retaliation for this
adherence, consequently, could be interpreted as an action taken
by one party to a contract to frustrate the counterparty’s ability to
satisfy its contractual obligations. As theWieder court stated: “It is
the law that in ‘every contract there is an implied undertaking on
the part of each party that he will not intentionally and purposely
do anything to prevent the other party from carrying out the
agreement on his part.’”185 Such conduct, as the Wieder court held,
could constitute a breach of an implied contract.186
Although this litigation strategy likely would receive a
cold reception before New York courts,187 it is worth noting that an
approach that borrows from and bends existing jurisprudence is
not as radical as some may fear. The strategy of applying both the
Wieder exception and existing contract jurisprudence to sustain a
claim of wrongful termination is inherently circumscribed by the
unique characteristics arising from the obligations imposed by
Dodd-Frank upon private investment advisers. Recognizing that
this new approach would arise only in the context of retaliation for
internal disclosure, private investment advisers may be willing to
forfeit a portion of their unencumbered right to discharge
employees because the adoption of this policy may further their
own compliance goals. As home to half of the world’s 20 largest
hedge funds,188 a New York policy that promotes and protects
internal disclosure may be in the best interest of employees,
employers, and the State.
185 Id. at 109 (quoting Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 97 N.E. 472, 473 (N.Y. 1912)).
186 Id.
187 “American courts, including our own, ‘have proved chary of creating
common-law exceptions to [the at-will] rule and reluctant to expand any exceptions
once fashioned.’” Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. 2012) (quoting Horn
v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755 (N.Y. 2003)). The majority in Sullivan also noted
that “the existence of federal regulation furnishes no reason to make state common law
governing the employer-employee relationship more intrusive.” Id. at 761.
188 Anthony Effinger et al., Top Hedge Fund Returning 45% Under Julian
Robertson’s 36-Year-Old Disciple, Attachment: The Largest Hedge Fund Firms,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-10/chase-
coleman-channels-ancestor-stuyvesant-with-45-robertson-like-return.html?cmpid=
(Attachment available at http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/r_qp33SAA4YE).
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CONCLUSION
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 triggered the worst
recession since the Great Depression.189 Between October 2007
and March 2009, the world watched as U.S. stock prices
halved.190 With a goal of promoting stability within the U.S.
financial system, Congress responded and passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010.191
Among the many amendments Dodd-Frank incorporated into
federal securities laws, Title IV of the statute required most
private investment advisers like hedge funds and private equity
funds to register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.192
Dodd-Frank did not, however, extend SOX’s protections against
retaliatory action for internal disclosure to employees of private
investment advisers.193
Under its current jurisprudence, however, New York courts
may be able to formulate a method to protect against retaliatory
action for employees of private investment advisers that make
internal disclosure. This framework would combine the policy of
industry-wide self-regulation espoused in Wieder v. Skala194 with
the contractual analysis found in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill.195 The
application of either case’s precedent alone is insufficient to
safeguard internal disclosure; the compliance obligations imposed
by Dodd-Frank upon employees of private advisers neither
represent “the very core”196 of their employment nor do they create
a “promise not to discharge . . . without . . . sufficient cause.”197 By
applying both Wieder and Weiner simultaneously, however, the
shortcomings of either may be digestible to a court that is wary of
changing its at-will employment doctrine.198 This adaptation would
189 Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data
Show, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI.
190 Gerald P. Dwyer, Stock Prices in Financial Crisis, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF ATLANTA (2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/pubscf/
stock_prices_infinancial_crisis.cfm.
191 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1377; S. Rep. No. 111-
176, at 1 (2010).
192 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1571 (2010)
(amending Registration of Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 83b-3(b)). See SEC Adopts
Dodd-Frank Act Amendments, supra note 73.
193 Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 17, at 18.
194 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
195 Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
196 Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 108.
197 Weiner, 443 N.E.2d at 445.
198 See Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 759-60 (N.Y. 2012) (outlining
New York’s at-will employment doctrine).
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benefit both employer and employee. By erecting a legal floor upon
which employees of private investment advisers can stand, New
York courts can offset the incentives pulling these employees to
make external disclosure. Increased internal disclosure, in turn,
will improve an employer’s ability to monitor its compliance with
federal securities laws.
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